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Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the members of the General Assembly the report of the Joint Inspection Unit entitled "Military component of United Nations peace-keeping operations" (JIU/REP/95/11).

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MILITARY COMPONENT OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS

Prepared by

Andrzej T. Abraszewski
Richard V. Hennes
Boris P. Krasulin
Khalil Issa Othman

Joint Inspection Unit

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Contents

		Paragraphs	Pages
Acronyms			v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS			vi
INTRODUCTION		1 - 3	1
I.	MANDATES FOR PEACE-KEEPING: MANAGERIAL ASPECTS	4 - 24	2
	A. The decision-making process	6 - 7	2
	B. Consultations, exchanges of views and briefings	8 - 16	2
	C. Command and control	17 - 24	4
	D. Recommendations		6
II.	AVAILABILITY OF TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT	25 - 59	8
	A. Rapid reaction force	29 - 32	8
	B. Stand-by arrangements	33 - 36	9
	C. Rapid reaction capability	37 - 39	10
	D. Role of/and relationship with regional organizations and arrangements	40 - 42	10
	E. Issues related to troops and equipment	43 - 59	10
	1. Rotation of troops	44 - 46	10
	2. Safety of personnel	47 - 48	12
	3. Death and disability benefits	49 - 50	12
	4. Reimbursement for equipment	51 - 54	12
	5. Procurement of equipment	55 - 59	13
	F. Recommendations		14
III.	CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT	60 - 89	16
	A. Headquarters	63 - 67	16
	B. The field	68 - 71	18
	C. Elements of successful peace-keeping operations	72 - 89	19
	1. Planning	73 - 77	19
	2. Legal arrangements	78 - 80	20
	3. Training	81 - 84	20
	4. Information	85 - 87	21
	5. Logistic support services	88 - 89	21
	D. Recommendations		22
	Notes		23

/...

Contents (2)

Annexes

I. Statement by the President of the Security Council S/PRST/1994/62 of 4 November 1994

II. United Nations stand-by arrangements: Status Report as of 9 May 1995

III. Summary of contributions

IV. Principles guiding relationships between the United Nations and regional organizations and arrangements

V. Organizational structure of United Nations entities concerned with peace-keeping operations

VI. Organizational structure of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations

Acronyms

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DAM	Department of Administration and Management
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peace-keeping Operations
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FALD	Field Administration and Logistics Division (DPKO)
IOR	Immediate Operational Requirement
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
MCDA	Military and Civil Defence Assets
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OLA	Office of Legal Affairs
PTS	Purchase and Transportation Service (DAM)
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNFICYP	United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In recent years the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations have undergone dramatic changes in terms of their scale and number, as well as their nature, functions, and resources involved. Thus, the Organization has been called upon to deploy large numbers of troops to meet concurrent situations, to provide humanitarian assistance in conflict situations and to help in the implementation of overall political settlements.

As a result of this new situation, peace-keeping operations are now multifaceted and multifunctional, calling for involvement of different departments within the United Nations Secretariat and different agencies within the United Nations system. This has given new dimensions to customary problems of management of peace-keeping operations and has generated a variety of new problems.

The Inspectors have treated a number of relevant issues under three general topics: (1) the managerial aspects of mandates of peace-keeping; (2) the availability of troops and equipment and, (3) the capacity of the United Nations Secretariat to cope with the tasks entrusted to it.

In discussing the mandates of and consultations for peace-keeping operations the Inspectors emphasized the importance of consultations among the parties involved in the decision-making process, namely: members of the Security Council; troop-contributing countries and the United Nations Secretariat. The parties involved in the conflict should also be consulted. They further underlined the necessity of unity of command and control for a successful peace-keeping operation.

Concerning availability of troops and equipment, the Inspectors pointed to two major problems and attempts to solve them: (i) the readiness of troops to participate actively in peace-keeping operations and (ii) the timely deployment of troops. Within this context the Inspectors discussed some of the ongoing efforts to improve the effectiveness of the United Nations peace-keeping operations: rapid reaction force; stand-by arrangements; rapid reaction capability, as well as other related issues such as rotation of troops; safety and security of personnel, death and disability benefits, reimbursement for equipment and procurement of equipment.

In discussing the capacity of the United Nations Secretariat to manage peace-keeping operations, the Inspectors dealt with the functioning and recent restructuring of different departments, especially DPKO, and concentrated on certain elements such as planning, legal arrangements, training, information and logistic support services. They also discussed the importance of communication and coordination within Headquarters and the field and between them.

Based on their interviews, research and consultations with the representatives of Member States and officials in the United Nations and on their conclusions, the Inspectors are advancing the following recommendations.

MANDATES FOR PEACE-KEEPING: MANAGERIAL ASPECTS (paras. 4-24)

RECOMMENDATION 1. That Member States and the United Nations Secretariat assure that all pertinent information, especially military advice and relevant considerations, be put before the Security Council, to enable the latter to decide between a range of realistic options and alternatives available to the United Nations in a particular peace-keeping situation. In this connection, reference is made to the proposals enumerated in paragraph 15.

RECOMMENDATION 2. That the Security Council and the United Nations Secretariat take the earliest possible measures to maximize the involvement of potential and selected troop-contributing countries in the consultations, preceding and subsequent to the development or modification of a peace-keeping mandate and the formation of an operational plan for implementing this mandate.

RECOMMENDATION 3. That, in order to assure unity of command, the operational authority of the Secretary-General or his representative in the field be respected, in United Nations peace-keeping operations and within specific mandates given by the Security Council. Moreover, the chief of the mission should ensure that national contingent commanders are involved in the operational planning and decision-making especially where their national contingents are concerned.

AVAILABILITY OF TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT (paras. 25-59)

RECOMMENDATION 4. That the General Assembly appoint a group of high-level governmental experts to prepare a report, within the context of peace-operations, on a more effective and reliable system of response by the United Nations to emergencies, building on the best aspects of two basic approaches: stand-by arrangements system and rapid reaction force.

RECOMMENDATION 5. That the Secretary-General, recognizing that the accepted tour of duty for peace-keeping troops is six months, nevertheless exceptionally encourage those troop-contributors, who are willing and able, to extend their tours in order to realize financial savings and gains in efficiency to the benefit of the United Nations.

RECOMMENDATION 6. That the General-Assembly call upon Member States to expedite the entry into force of the Convention of the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel by early signing and ratification.

RECOMMENDATION 7. That the Secretary-General:

(a) respond expeditiously to the General Assembly's call for standardization of death and disability benefits and submit at an early date his views on a comprehensive insurance scheme to cover these benefits;

(b) streamline procedures for the rapid reimbursement to Member States of the costs attendant upon the use and depreciation of their equipment;

(c) continue his implementation of the report of the High-level Expert Procurement Group and in the process give particular attention to the transparency and specificity of procurement information, in order to assure free competition and equal chances to all interested providers of goods and services.

CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT (paras. 60-89)

RECOMMENDATION 8. That the Secretary-General continue his efforts to assure the DPKO, as the lead peace-keeping department, seek, receive, and benefit from the contribution of other United Nations departments in the planning and management of peace-keeping operations.

RECOMMENDATION 9. That the Secretary-General:

(a) enhance the planning and operational capacity of DPKO, including the translation of the peace-keeping mandate into a detailed and specific operational plan comprehensible to all, especially at Headquarters and in the field, by establishing within the Department "classical general staff" with the possibility of having personnel on loan from different Member States;

(b) ensure that DPKO build up its capacity to gather and analyse more information about areas of peace-keeping, inter alia with the possible assistance of Member States;

(c) also ensure that the DPKO build up skilled personnel, both military and civilian, amongst whom a rapidly deployable temporary Headquarters team can be despatched to the field at a short notice.

(d) carry out the full integration of the Field Administration and Logistics Division with the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

RECOMMENDATION 10. That the Secretary-General, acting through his field representatives, maximize synergy among military contingents and between military and civilian components, with particular emphasis on the maintenance of strict and reciprocal channels of communication within the field and between Headquarters and the field.

INTRODUCTION

1. As the Secretary-General observes in his "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace"[1], there have been dramatic changes in the nature of United Nations activities in the field of peace and security in recent years. In addition to traditional peace-keeping operations where observers are deployed to hold a cease-fire with the consent of the parties the United Nations is increasingly called upon to perform a variety of new functions, such as provision of humanitarian relief in conflict situations and assistance in the implementation of overall settlements. Moreover, the United Nations has been called upon to deploy large numbers of troops when there is a breakdown of a state's internal structure and/or civil strife. Thus, the new generation of peace-keeping operations are multifaceted, multifunctional, calling for involvement of different departments within the United Nations Secretariat and different agencies within the United Nations system and, of particular importance, calling for coordination between military and civilian components.

2. Many entities (international, governmental and scholarly), have examined the evolving nature of United Nations peace-keeping and have made proposals for improvement in the capacity of the United Nations to deal with this situation. In 1992 the Joint Inspection Unit has issued a Note on "Some proposals for improving the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations" (JIU/NOTE/92/1). In 1993 the JIU examined certain aspects of the civilian component of peace-keeping and related missions[2], and is now concerned with the military component of United Nations peace-keeping operations. Thus, the basic objective of the present report is to contribute to current efforts to improve the capability of the United Nations for planning and managing the military component of peace operations. For this purpose, the Inspectors examined a number of relevant issues. The results of this examination are presented under three broad areas, namely: (1) the managerial aspects of mandates for peace keeping; (2) the availability of troops and equipment; and (3) the capacity of the United Nations Secretariat to cope with the new situation. In this report, the Inspectors deal with peace-keeping operations and not with peace-enforcement activities.

3. In the course of their review, the Inspectors consulted extensively in New York with representatives of Member States and officials in the United Nations and visited Capitals of certain major troop-contributing countries. They conducted in all interviews with more than one hundred individuals. These included: officials concerned with United Nations peace-keeping in Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs; representatives of Members of the Security Council and/or major troop-contributing countries, including military personnel; representatives of the Secretariat; and other knowledgeable individuals, including those with field experience. The present report is based on these interviews and on relevant documentation. The Inspectors wish to express their appreciation to all those who contributed their ideas and expertise.

I. MANDATES FOR PEACE KEEPING: MANAGERIAL ASPECTS

4. Mandates for peace keeping operations derive from resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. These are the outcome of a process of consultations and negotiations among those most closely concerned, namely: the parties directly involved and frequently some of their neighbours; members of the Security Council; potential or selected troop contributing countries and the Secretariat which bears the primary responsibility to provide information, analysis, advice and follow-up.

5. This chapter will briefly discuss issues related to, and problems arising from, the associated processes of decision-making and consultations. It will examine the question of translating mandates into operational plans and practical activities and, within that context, address the important issue of command and control. The primary concern of the Inspectors is to look into the managerial aspects of peace-keeping operations.

A. The decision-making process

6. In traditional peace-keeping operations where three principles are applied, namely: (i) consent of the parties; (ii) impartiality and (iii) non-use of force except in self-defence, the Security Council mandates have usually been straightforward and well defined. The outcome and practical implementation on the ground have usually been smooth without major problems. However, with regard to the new generation of peace-keeping operations and their multifaceted characteristics the mandates may not be as precise as needed leading to difficulties in implementation. Under these circumstances the preparation, timing, efforts, consultations and transparency of the decision-making process become the more important for arriving at a practical consensus, one with good probabilities for successful implementation. Such a consensus would take into consideration the conflicting views of the parties and/or others concerned as well as the political will and financial commitments of Member States and the capacity of the United Nations Secretariat to handle such operations.

7. Decision-making in peace-keeping operations is an iterative process. While it culminates in the adoption of a Security Council resolution this act is preceded and followed up by processes of consultations, exchanges of views, briefings, negotiations and possible compromises among the different parties. The nature and emphasis of such consultations prior to and after the adoption of a resolution are different. In the following section the Inspectors deal with these consultations, exchanges of views and briefings and the parties involved.

B. Consultations, exchanges of views and briefings

8. The main actors concerned in formulating, adopting and executing a mandate for peace-keeping operations, besides the parties directly involved in the conflict, are: (i) all members of the Security Council, especially the permanent five, (ii) troop-contributing countries and (iii) the United Nations Secretariat.

9. The formulation and adoption of a mandate is the prerogative of the Security Council. But the Security Council, notwithstanding specific and detailed information some members may have, relies on information and analysis provided by the Secretariat. The role of the Secretariat in this regard becomes critical in assessing the situation and in proposing response(s) and action(s) that are necessary and possible. This role could be

reinforced or challenged by information and analysis given by members of the Security Council and in some cases by potential troop contributing countries. The role of the troop contributing countries in the consultation and decision-making process is also of considerable value; in recent cases some two thirds of the troops serving in peace-keeping operations have been contributed by non-permanent members and non-members of the Security Council[3]. Hence the necessity for consultations at the broadest possible spectrum. General Assembly resolution 48/43 of 10 December 1993 called upon the Secretary-General to strengthen existing arrangements for consultation and exchange of information among the Security Council, troop contributing countries and the Secretariat.

10. The President of the Security Council on 4 November 1994 and on behalf of the Council stressed the need and delineated the procedures for institutionalizing consultations with troop-contributing countries (See annex I), Subparagraph (a) of that statement reads:

> "(a) Meetings should be held as a matter of course between Members of the Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat to facilitate the exchange of information and views in good time before the Council takes decisions on the extension or termination of, or significant changes in the mandate of a particular peace-keeping operation." [our emphasis].

11. It is noted that these procedures did not refer to consultations with potential troop-contributing countries prior to an adoption of a decision by the Security Council or even prior to planning of deployment of forces. In the opinion of the Inspectors, this omission was unfortunate, detrimental to the consultative process and should be rectified.

12. This situation was partly offset by informal briefing sessions held by the Secretariat with potential troop contributing countries. The Secretariat purpose was to provide such countries, before a new operation was launched, with information about operational plans and likely challenges in order to help these countries to decide on their degree and kind of contributions. However, Secretarial time and staffing constraints[4] resulted in briefings which were considered inadequate by a number of concerned Member States.

13. Although such briefings are important for engaging troop contributing countries at the stage of planning for deployment, the Inspectors believe it even more important that the Security Council should have high quality political and military advice in order to reach clear and specific mandates. The Council, in its presidential statement of 22 February 1995, stressed the importance it "attaches to the provision of the fullest possible information to the Council to assist it in making decisions regarding the mandate, duration and termination of current operations".[5] The Council thus relies on the Secretariat to provide the required information in an efficient manner.

14. Doubts have been expressed by Member States as to the capacity of the Secretariat to provide the Council with the required advice on such matters as the forces required for particular objectives; objectives achievable in the light of available forces; and the likely consequences and risks of military action.[6] Representatives of troop-contributing countries, including some members of the Security Council, with whom the Inspectors consulted were of the opinion that the United Nations structure at Headquarters, although considerably improved, had not yet evolved sufficiently to provide effective advice on military requirements and strategies.

15. A number of suggestions have been made to improve the quality of information and advice provided to the Security Council. These include:

(a) fact-finding missions which would include potential force commanders, military staff and civilians when the United Nations is considering a peace-keeping operation. The reports of these missions can then be used as input for the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council. A roster of such personnel within the Secretariat and outside could be established;

(b) reactivation in accordance with Article 47 of the United Nations Charter of the role of the Military Staff Committee "to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal."

(c) creation of a subsidiary organ in the Security Council in accordance with Article 29 of the Charter whose membership would be larger than that of the Military Staff Committee and whose task would be to coordinate consultations and the flow of information between the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop contributing countries on the objectives of a United Nations peace keeping operation and the ranges of measures to achieve these objectives;

(d) formation of "Friends of the Secretary-General" as was the case in El Salvador or a "Core Group" as was the case in Cambodia or "International Contact Group" as was the case in Somalia. Such groups are considered to be useful in providing active political support to the Secretary-General, facilitating frank exchange of views on delicate matters and "proposing innovative solutions to the problems which arise in the course of United Nations peace-keeping operations and as such complement the role of broader groupings of troop contributing nations."[7]

16. Concerning the foregoing suggestions, the Inspectors recall that the 1993 JIU report mentioned before recommended the utilization of fact finding missions and they reiterate this recommendation. As for the suggestion to revitalize the role of the Military Staff Committee, the Inspectors' consultations revealed not enough support at this time among representatives of Member States. The Inspectors believe there is merit in the proposal for creating a subsidiary organ of the Security Council for the purposes specified. Modalities such as those specified in suggestion (d) should continue to be utilized.

C. Command and control

17. Recent United Nations General Assembly resolutions have stressed the importance of unity of command and control. Resolutions 48/42 and 48/43 of 10 December 1993 urged the Secretary-General to initiate a comprehensive review of the role, tasks and functions of the various units of the Secretariat with a view of assuring the unity of command and control; and to strengthen arrangements for political direction and military command and control. Resolution 49/37 of 9 December 1994 stressed the need for a unified and well-defined United Nations command and control structure with clear functions between Headquarters and the field.

18. As noted in the Secretary-General's report A/49/681 of 21 November 1994, assuring the unity of command and control is indispensable for successful peace-keeping. Any gaps, misunderstandings or conflicting orders and moves (either in Headquarters or in the field and especially between the Force Commander and commanders of different contingents as well as between headquarters and the field, or between national contingents and their capitals outside the United Nations framework), will subject the operation to frictions and dangers to the detriment of achieving the objectives of the operation. Based on their interviews with officials in some Member States (mainly missions in New York and in particular military advisors in those missions) the Inspectors have been alerted to a number of problems in command and control.

19. Three distinct interrelated levels of command have been recognized:

(a) The **strategic level** (also referred to as the overall political direction) which is the prerogative of the Security Council. At this level the mandate of an operation is defined reflecting the will of the international community. As discussed in the previous section it is important to have a clear, well defined and easily understood and accepted mandate. Moreover, a mandate should not be blurred by subsequent changes.

(b) The **operational level** (also referred to as the executive direction and control) which is provided by the Secretary-General. At this level the efforts and inputs of the Secretariat (with the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) having a leading role) assume special importance in translating the mandate or the strategic positions into practical understandable and detailed operational plans and activities. It is the responsibility of the Secretariat to put a mandate into a workable plan. While some may argue that this could be the exclusive prerogative of the Secretariat, the Inspectors conclude from their interviews that the Secretariat should share this planning exercise with troop contributing countries on a regular and continuous basis. It is important that all parties concerned with the implementation of the plan have the same understandings and are cognizant of their different but complementary roles. So far the Secretariat has not been able to translate fully the mandate into specific comprehensible plans although in certain cases this was partly due to ambigous and contradictory mandates.

(c) The **tactical level** (or command in the field) which resides in the chief of mission: the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, or in his absence the Force Commander. At this level the chief of the mission exercises authority over all the components of an operation including the national contingents assigned to a peace-keeping operation. It is equally important to have well defined tasks, geographical areas of operation and the time frame of tours of duty for each contingent.

20. While these three levels have their distinct functions and responsibilities they should not be seen as independent of each other but rather as parts of a command and control continuum.

21. Almost all representatives of troop-contributing countries interviewed stated that, as a matter of principle, they had no difficulties in serving under the United Nations operational command within specific mandate(s). However, problems of command and control have arisen in the past. Some of these problems are a result of Headquarters second-guessing the field or vice versa. The major problem is due to questions concerning the exercise or authority over national contingents in the field. Despite this, there are difficulties in coordinating activities of command and control of different contingents.

These problems could be results of the unclear operational plans or because of deficiencies in tactical activities and communications.

22. The Secretary-General's report A/49/681 of 21 November 1994 provides, in the view of the Inspectors, the following valuable exposition of the ingredients of a good working relationship between the head of mission and the national contingent commanders:

> " In the field, common sense and sound management practice dictate that the head of mission ensures that national contingent commanders are involved in operational planning and decision-making, especially where their respective contingents are concerned. Such involvement should take the form of consultations among professionals in a unified force. However, they cannot be allowed to develop into indirect negotiations with national headquarters, which could impede action and undermine the willingness and vigour with which the orders of the United Nations are carried out." (paras. 19, p. 5)

The report is similarly succinct in identifying the appropriate channel to which Governements contributing personnel can make their views known:

> "The Governments contributing troops and other personnel to an operation have a natural and legitimate interest in satisfying themselves that their personnel are employed as effectively as possible, in accordance with the Security Council's mandate, and without exposing them to unnecessary risk. Similarly, they will form views regarding the course of action pursued in an operation, especially when it faces difficulties. The channel through which these views should be articulated, however, is United Nations Headquarters, in dialogue with the Secretariat, with other troop contributors and with the Security Council, rather than unilaterally through their contingent commanders." (para. 20, p. 6)

23. There are also problems of command and control arising from the participation in a peace-keeping exercise of forces not under direct United Nations command, e.g. a coalition or a regional organization or arrangement such as NATO. A serious problem would arise if a group of countries went beyond the mandate of the Security Council. This situation would be for the Security Council to address. However, other problems have arisen when the action was within the Security Council mandate(s). These were related to cooperation, coordination and complementarity of roles of the United Nations and non United Nations forces. Differences of opinion subject the unity of command and control to possible failure and undermine authority of the United Nations.

24. Besides the issues and factors mentioned above for the effectiveness of command and control it is equally important that troop contributing countries are willing to place adequately trained and equipped personnel under the authority of the United Nations. The availability of troops and equipment is the subject of Chapter II.

D. Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION 1. That Member States and the United Nations Secretariat assure that all pertinent information, especially military advice and relevant considerations, be put before the Security Council, to enable the latter to decide between a range of realistic options and alternatives available to the United Nations in a particular peace-keeping situation. In this connection, reference is made to the proposals enumerated in paragraph 15 above.

RECOMMENDATION 2. That the Security Council and the United Nations Secretariat take the earliest possible measures to maximize the involvement of potential and selected troop-contributing countries in the consultations preceding and subsequent to the development or modification of a peace-keeping mandate and the formation of an operational plan for implementing this mandate.

RECOMMENDATION 3. That, in order to assure unity of command, the operational authority of the Secretary-General or his representative in the field be respected, in United Nations peace-keeping operations and within specific mandates given by the Security Council. Moreover, the chief of the mission should ensure that national contingent commanders are involved in the operational planning and decision-making especially where their national contingents are concerned.

II. AVAILABILITY OF TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT

25. As earlier emphasized, it is important that troop contributing countries place adequately trained and equipped personnel under the authority of the United Nations. However, from the interviews conducted for the present report, the Inspectors understand that there are problems concerning: (i) the readiness of troops to participate actively in United Nations peace-keeping operations; and (ii) the timely deployment of troops.

26. The first category of problems is partly brought about by the fact that United Nations forces are composed of troops from different countries with varying degrees of readiness. As noted by the Secretary-General in his "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace", some troops arrive without equipment[8] and must therefore be supplemented with and trained in the use of the equipment provided. The bulk of opinion sampled by the Inspectors strongly supported the ideal situation where priority be given to the selection of contributors of troops having such essentials as knowledge of peace-keeping doctrine, adequate equipment, compatible communications and the necessary related training. However, in view of practical difficulties, all above requirements may not be fulfilled.

27. With regard to the second category of problems, which concerns the timely deployment of troops, experience has shown that even when troops are ready it often takes so much time before their actual deployment that the success of the operation is jeopardized. Even after the timely deployment of troops in a high state of readiness to participate in operations, there may still be operational problems to overcome. These include inadequate logistics support and coordination between Headquarters and the field as well as within the field.

28. This chapter considers ways of improving the above situation through: (a) a rapid reaction force, (b) stand-by arrangements, (c) a rapid reaction capability, (d) regional organizations and arrangements; and (e) issues related to troops and equipment. These latter issues include (1) rotation of troops; (2) safety and security of personnel; (3) death and disability benefits; (4) reimbursement for equipment; and (5) procurement of equipment.

A. Rapid reaction force

29. A "rapid reaction force" - and stand-by arrangements which will be considered in section B below - are important elements of on-going efforts to improve the effectiveness of United Nations peace-keeping operations. The present stand-by arrangements offer no guarantee that troops will be provided for a specific operation and in time. The Secretary-General has cited as an example the experience with the expansion of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) when not one of the 19 governments which at that time had undertaken to have troops on stand-by agreed to contribute. In his "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" the Secretary-General suggests the creation of a rapid reaction force, which would be the Security Council's strategic reserve for deployment for emergency need.[9]

30. The idea of a rapid reaction force is not new. A similar idea was suggested by the first Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, in 1948 and by others during the following decades[10]. What is new is the pressing need for increased United Nations capability to respond quickly to complex emergencies including those caused by intra-state conflicts.

31. The Government of the Netherlands tried to develop further the concept of a rapid reaction force. It proposed "the establishment of a full time professional, at all times available and rapidly deployable United Nations Brigade for this purpose: a United Nations Legion at the disposal of the Security Council". It could be used for: preventive deployment when crises are imminent; peace-keeping during the interval between a Security Council decision and the arrival

of an international peace-keeping force; and deployment in humanitarian emergency situations. The personnel of the proposed brigade would be recruited and employed on an individual basis by the United Nations. In order to avoid the implications of mercenary troops the procedure should be followed similar to the one which currently applies to the recruitment of military personnel for the Secretariat, in which national governments of Member States serve as intermediaries between the United Nations and the applicants. Depending on the modalities chosen, the annual cost of such a Brigade can roughly be estimated initially at between US$ 250 million and US$ 300 million. It should be financed outside the regular budget and the cost should be apportioned among members according to the ad hoc scale of assessments for peace-keeping operations[11]. The Netherlands considers the idea of a rapid reaction brigade as a long-term objective.

32. Although Member States have considered the idea of a rapid reaction force they recognize that a number of questions are outstanding including: financing, size, functions, training, command and control, location of the force, transportation, and the geographical distribution of soldiers.

B. Stand-by arrangements

33. The concept of "stand-by arrangements" which was first introduced in "An Agenda for Peace"[12], arose because United Nations response time was no longer considered adequate for dealing with fast moving situations. In order to improve the response time, the Secretary-General requested that troops and resources should be earmarked and made available to the United Nations at short notice. This system is based upon commitments by Member States to contribute specified resources to the United Nations within agreed response times.

34. These pre-arrangements negotiated between the United Nations and individual Member States provide that the resources agreed upon remain on stand-by status in their home country, where necessary training is conducted to fulfill specified tasks or functions in accordance with United Nations guidelines. In order to ensure that all Member States can participate, regardless of their size, capabilities or situation, the structures of the stand-by arrangement system are broken down by functions and tasks into building blocks of various sizes and configurations.[13]

35. In May 1995, two Member States (Jordan and Denmark) signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the Stand-by Arrangements. In addition, 39 countries have officially expressed their willingness to participate in the United Nations stand-by arrangements system, with offered resources totalling approximately 72,000 personnel, (See Annex II: A status report on United Nations stand-by arrangements). These memoranda include specific information on resources provided, response times and conditions for employment, as well as technical data or requirements regarding contributions (see Annex III).

36. The stand-by arrangements system is an evolving concept and it still needs improvement. The Security Council, in its presidential statement of 22 February 1995, stated that "the first priority in improving the capacity for rapid deployment should be the further enhancement of the existing stand-by arrangements, covering the full spectrum of resources, including arrangements for lift and headquarters capabilities, required to mount and execute peace-keeping operations".[14] At its 1995 session, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations made similar recommendations. The Special Committee also suggested the extension of the arrangements beyond troops to other important elements, including headquarters components, transport capacity, and civilian personnel, such as police. The Committee also stressed that while the effectiveness of stand-by arrangements depended upon the political will of Member States, it also depended upon the precision of the data provided to the Secretariat.[15]

C. Rapid reaction capability

37. The concept of "rapid reaction capability" is also being developed. For example, the Government of Canada is expected to complete its study on a rapid reaction capability before the fiftieth session of the General Assembly. A 1994 US paper on reforming multilateral peace operations stated: "The United States does not support a standing United Nations army, nor will we earmark specific military units for participation in United Nations operations. We will provide information about U.S. capabilities for data bases and planning purposes."

38. Denmark has proposed the establishment of an international working group to develop multinational United Nations stand-by forces high readiness brigade with a view to improving the existing stand-by arrangements system. Departing from the existing stand-by arrangements system, such a brigade is expected to be fully operational, including the normal equipment necessary for it to function. The need for a coherent and inter-operable brigade coupled with prudent, economic consideration calls for such a unit to be developed among nations with forces already having the ability to work together or with the potential and inclination to develop such a capability.[16]

39. In its resolution 998 (1995) of 16 June 1995, the Security Council welcomed the establishment of what was termed a rapid reaction force to enable UNPROFOR to carry out its mandate, and authorized an increase in UNPROFOR personnel by up to 12,500 additional troops.[17] These would provide the Commander of UNPROFOR with well-armed and mobile forces with which to respond promptly to threats to United Nations personnel.[18]

D. Role of/and relationship with regional organizations and arrangements

40. Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in peace-related activities under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter was the subject of a JIU report entitled, "Sharing responsibilities in peace-keeping: the United Nations and regional organizations" (JIU/REP/95/4).

41. Regional defense organizations may provide operational support to United Nations forces. This is currently the case with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO and the European Union are also engaged in the joint monitoring and enforcement of the arms embargo and the economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Other examples include United Nations missions deployed in Liberia with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and in Georgia with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

42. The Security Council, in its presidential statement of 22 February 1995 stressed the need for effective coordination between these organizations and the United Nations.[19] The Inspectors note that the Secretary-General has identified certain principles on which relationship with regional organizations and arrangements should be based.[20] (See annex IV.)

E. Issues related to troops and equipment

43. Some of the issues discussed in this section relate specifically to troops or to equipment, while others relate to both.

1. Rotation of troops

44. The present duration of duty for military personnel is six months. As the table shows, extensions in the duration of duty would realize savings. The Inspectors were informed by

troop-contributing countries that economy should not be the main factor for determining the duration of duty. Most would prefer to maintain the six-months period; some would even favour a shorter duration. They would argue that a term longer than six months could have negative effects on operational readiness. For example, governments would have to earmark troops for considerably more than six months owing to the necessity for training and other preparatory activities. At the same time, a tour of duty for draftees in many of those countries is less than one year. National legislation in some countries requires the governments concerned to increase payment to soldiers serving longer than six months. There are also alleged to be negative psychological effects on soldiers serving for more than six months. Some countries rotate their national contingents every three or four months at their own cost. Other countries rotate a certain percentage at a time within a Unit at their own expense. Still, others do rotate their troops beyond the six-months duration.

Examples of contingent rotation costs over a 12-months period

Mission	Return journey (US $)	Contingent strength	Rotation every:		
			6 months (US $)	9 months (US $)	12 months (US $)
UNPROFOR	390 a/ 945 b/ Totals	24,532 15,664 40,216	19,134,773 29,643,214 48,777,986	14,351,080 22,232,410 36,583,490	9,567,386 14,821,607 24,388,993
UNAMIR	880	5,500	9,680,000	7,250,000	4,840,000
UNIFIL	755	5,015	7,572,650	5,679,488	3,786,324
UNFICYP	900	1,230	2,214,000	1,660,500	1,107,000

Source: DPKO/FALD

Note: a/ Rotation within Europe; b/ Rotation outside Europe

45. In a 1992 Note (JIU/NOTE/92/1) the JIU considered the issue of rotation and recommended that "the Secretary-General propose the extension of the rotation period for peace-keeping troops from six months to one year. Not only would this practice save substantial sums (estimated at $15 million per annum for a current set of peace-keeping operations) but, even more importantly, it would improve the effectiveness of peace-keeping troops by a factor of 25 per cent. On a six-months rotation, troops typically lose one month in orientation and acclimatisation and one month in preparing for departure - four effective months in six. On a one-year rotation and the same loss of two months, the troops are effective ten months of twelve, a gain of two months per year".

46. The Secretary-General stated in May 1994 that the question of duration of duty of military personnel and the timing of rotation was under study.[21] The ACABQ suggested that the study should address, inter alia, the issue of extending the duration of duty of military personnel, including ways and means of facilitating such an extension, and the question of the duration of duty in the mission of military officers assigned to administrative, planning or logistics functions (A/49/664, para. 77). Given the operational implications of the question of tours of duty of contingents, the General Assembly, in its resolution 49/233 of 23 December 1994, requested the Secretary-General to present the report to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations. The report was not submitted to the 1995 session of the Special Committee.

2. Safety of personnel

47. As of 8 May 1995, total fatalities among United Nations peace-keepers were 1,289, of which 841 occurred during missions which are currently in operation. Concerned with the increasing number of attacks on United Nations peace-keepers, the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, in 1995, urged the Secretariat to intensify its efforts to improve the safety and security environment for peace-keepers and stated that the security of personnel should be made an integral part of the planning of all United Nations peace-keeping operations.[22]

48. The General Assembly, on 9 December 1994, adopted resolution 49/59 which annexes the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel. "United Nations personnel" includes members of the military component of United Nations operations. As of June 1995, there are 29 signatories to the Convention. The Convention shall enter into force 30 days after 22 instruments of ratification, approval or accession have been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations[23].

3. Death and disability benefits

49. The current scheme of compensation for death and disability is based on national legislation which varies from country to country, and therefore results in unequal treatment.[24] The ACABQ noted a great variance in payments from end 1992 to September 1994. In the case of death, it ranged from US$ 19,500 to US$ 85,300. The range for disability was from US$ 1,500 to US$ 224,200.[25] There are also administrative difficulties owing to a number of factors including appropriate certification and adequacy of documentation. There is a need to revise the current arrangements.

50. The General Assembly, in its resolution 49/233, requested the Secretary-General to present concrete proposals on possible revisions to the current compensation arrangements based on the following principles: (a) equal treatment of Member States; (b) compensation to the beneficiary that is not lower than reimbursement by the United Nations; (c) simplification of administrative arrangements to the extent possible; and (d) speedy settlement of claims for death and disability. In compliance with this resolution, the Secretariat has proposed a uniform global insurance scheme to cover all troops because it meets all the criteria described above. It is also more straightforward to administer and offers significant protection to the United Nations in the event of catastrophic loss of life or serious injury. Since it is very difficult to obtain commercial coverage at viable rates, the Secretariat proposed a United Nations-administered scheme.[26] The proposed scheme would cover all contingent troops and would be funded from amounts paid into a global fund from each peace-keeping operation budget. All unused monies would remain in the fund and be carried forward. These unused amounts are expected to accumulate over time to a level that would provide the United Nations with a degree of protection that is not now available against catastrophic loss available.[27]

4. Reimbursement for equipment

51. Contingent-owned equipment is defined as "major and minor equipment and consumable owned or leased, and operated by a troop-contributing country's contingent in the performance of peace-keeping operations".[28] Major equipment consists of ground vehicles and trailers, aircraft, naval vessels and specifically identified "stand-alone" specialist equipment. Minor equipment includes equipment used for catering, accommodation, non-specialist communications and engineering.[29]

52. The majority of troop-contributing countries interviewed for the present report had difficulty in being reimbursed for the use and depreciation of their own equipment during United Nations peace-keeping operations. In fact, no reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment had actually been paid until September 1994. The Inspectors were also informed of causes of delay in reimbursement which included: lack of clear guidelines; lack of sufficient documentation in claims; lack of experienced staff capable of managing an ever-increasing volume of claims; and the unavailability of financial resources. The current procedures for determining reimbursement to Member States are considered cumbersome as they require protracted negotiations on the value of equipment. In its report on the administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peace-keeping operations, the ACABQ had identified similar causes.[30]

53. Being aware of these problems, the General Assembly in its resolution 49/233 authorized the Secretary-General to proceed with the project aimed at setting comprehensive standards for each category of equipment, as well as establishing rates of reimbursement. The Assembly invited Member States to contribute voluntarily to participation in the project. This project comprises five phases. Under Phase II, a working group consisting of technical experts from troop-contributing countries met from 27 March to 7 April 1995. It adopted a number of recommendations on various issues with a view to reforming methodology and procedures for determining reimbursement. They include: equipment classification on which the reimbursement should be based; a wet and dry lease system (change from the current depreciation-based system) for reimbursement.[31] Under a dry lease, the United Nations assumes responsibility for maintaining the equipment, while a wet lease requires the contributing country to be responsible for maintenance.[32] The reform process continues to Phase III of the project to be undertaken by financial experts.

54. In the opinion of the Inspectors the Secretary-General has the necessary guidance and instructions to cope with the complex issues of reimbursement.

5. Procurement of equipment

55. Ideally contributing countries should ensure that their military contingents arrive in the field with all the equipment needed to be fully operational. In practice, however, some of them arrive either unequipped or poorly equipped. This necessitates the United Nations procuring equipment on the market or through voluntary contributions from other Member States. Further time is required for training and familiarization with the equipment, including its use and maintenance. In order to improve the situation, the Secretary-General proposed the establishment by the United Nations of a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment and partnership between governments that need equipment and those ready to provide it.[33]

56. During the consultations for the present report, the Inspectors have been informed by a number of troop-contributing countries that it would be difficult for them to accept standardization of certain equipment that has a bearing on the safety of troops on the ground. Furthermore, this equipment could not be stockpiled as it would become obsolete and spare parts would be difficult to find. Other types of equipment, such as communication equipment, can however be standardized and stockpiled.

57. The procurement of equipment has been the subject of scrutiny from Member States and oversight bodies. During the course of the interviews for the present report, a large number of troop-contributing countries expressed their concern that there was neither transparency about United Nations procurement nor explicit criteria for selection of vendors, and therefore equal opportunity for participating in United Nations procurement might not exist. The Inspectors have been informed by the Secretariat that one possible reason for this impression

of lack of transparency is the fact that about 25 per cent of peace-keeping procurement is acquired by the "Letter of Assist" procedure, which does not require open bidding. In 1993, about US $147 million-worth of procurement was acquired through this procedure from 52 countries, with the largest amount paid to one country being about US $33 million and the smallest being US $880. In 1994, the value of procurement thus acquired increased to about US $369 million. The largest sum paid to one country was about US $134 million and the smallest US $4,132. Goods and services which the United Nations is responsible for providing to national contingents, such as rations and transportation of troops, are sometimes provided by troop-contributing countries themselves. In these cases, the contributing countries are reimbursed by the "Letter of Assist" with the prior agreement of the United Nations. In addition, unique and non-commercially procurable items have also been acquired through this procedure. The Secretariat stated that this has created some concern among Member States.

58. The question of procurement was reviewed in 1994 by an independent high level group of experts which concluded that the Secretariat lacked the ability and capability, both at management and staff levels, and a system to provide an effective procurement service to peace-keeping operations.[34] Both the High-level Expert Procurement Group and the Board of Auditors found abuse of the Immediate Operational Requirement (IOR) procedure, which waived the requirement for open bidding.[35] The General Assembly, in its resolution 49/216, endorsed the recommendation of the Board to reduce excessive flexibility in the use of the exigency provision (i.e., IOR) in procurement and the awarding of contracts.

59. The report of the High-level Expert Procurement Group is generally considered a very good study which the Inspectors believe would help improve the situation. Some troop-contributing countries, however, expressed their concern to the Inspectors that it was not clear how the Secretariat would implement the recommendations of the report. Subsequently the Secretariat submitted in June 1995 a progress report on the plan of action for procurement reform.[36] Although this report states that the Secretary-General has accepted most of the recommendations made by the High-level Expert Procurement Group[37] it is too early to form an opinion on the success of its implementation.

F. Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION 4. That the General Assembly appoint a group of high-level governmental experts to prepare a report, within the context of peace-keeping operations, on a more effective and reliable system of response by the United Nations to emergencies, building on the best aspects of two basic approaches: stand-by arrangements system and rapid reaction force.

RECOMMENDATION 5. That the Secretary-General, recognizing that the accepted tour of duty for peace-keeping troops is six months, nevertheless exceptionally encourage those troop-contributors, who are willing and able, to extend their tours in order to realize financial savings and gains in efficiency to the benefit of the United Nations.

RECOMMENDATION 6. That the General Assembly call upon Member States to expedite the entry into force of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel by early signing and ratification.

RECOMMENDATION 7. That the Secretary-General:

(a) respond expeditiously to the General Assembly's call for standardization of death and disability benefits and submit at an early date his views on a comprehensive insurance scheme to cover these benefits;

(b) streamline procedures for the rapid reimbursement to Member States of the costs attendant upon the use and depreciation of their equipment;

(c) continue his implementation of the report of the High-level Expert Procurement Group and in the process give particular attention to the transparency and specificity of procurement information, in order to assure free competition and equal chances to all interested providers of goods and services.

III. CAPACITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

60. Since the JIU reported on the civilian component of peace-keeping operations in 1993 (JIU/REP/93/6) the United Nations operations have continued to grow quantitatively and to undergo qualitative changes. In order to plan and manage these numerous and increasingly complex operations more effectively, it is necessary for the relevant departments of the Secretariat to "function as an integrated whole" but with clear, distinct responsibilities.[38] The Secretary-General's further restructuring initiatives in the political and humanitarian sectors were, therefore, aimed at consolidating, streamlining and enhancing the capacity of the Secretariat in this respect. This was done by combining dispersed Secretariat activities into three restructured departments, namely, DPKO, DPA and DHA.[39] Needless to say, DPKO is the lead department for peace-keeping activities, but there are major inputs from DPA and DHA, depending on the mandate and status of a peace-keeping operation. Other offices and departments also provide support to peace-keeping operations. These include the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), the Department of Administration and Management (DAM) and the Department of Public Information (DPI) (see annex V).

61. This chapter describes briefly the Secretariat peace-keeping structure and functions, particularly those of DPKO, including its divisions and units, and how this Department deals with the military component of peace-keeping. The chapter deals with structures and functions in the field as well as the interrelationship between Headquarters and the field. It also highlights a number of important issues in which different departments are involved and which have a direct bearing on the efficiency of peace-keeping operations. These include planning, legal arrangements, training, information and logistic support services.

62. The 1993 JIU report contained a number of recommendations relating to the restructuring of the Secretariat as well as interrelationships among different elements of peace-keeping operations. Those recommendations relevant to the military component are discussed, as appropriate, in subsequent paragraphs.

A. Headquarters

63. A number of departments at Headquarters are involved in peace operations. The degree, intensity and timing of their involvement depend on the stage and nature of a peace operation: peacemaking, peace-keeping or peace-building. As the lead department in peace-keeping DPKO is discussed below and in detail. Other departments involved are referred to within the context of Section C: Elements of successful peace-keeping operations.

The Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO)

64. The Department of Peace-keeping Operations was established in 1992. It serves as the operational arm of the Secretary-General for all United Nations field operations, in particular the management and direction of peace-keeping operations. The Department is responsible, inter alia, for the following functions:

(a) to formulate policies and procedures, based on Security Council decisions, for the establishment of new peace-keeping operations and the effective functioning of the ongoing operations;

(b) to secure military units and equipment as well as other material and human resources required for peace-keeping operations;

(c) to develop operational plans and methodologies for multidimensional operations;

(d) to undertake contingency planning for possible new peace-keeping operations and related activities;

(e) to provide logistic and administrative support for the operations in the field.[40]

65. After major restructuring and strengthening DPKO presently consists of the Office of the Under-Secretary-General and two main offices, both of which are headed by an Assistant Secretary-General:

(i) the Office of Under-Secretary-General which comprises: the Executive Office, the Policy and Analysis Unit, the Situation Centre and the Military Adviser's Office. The Military Advisor (at the rank of D-2) advises the Secretary-General and Force Commanders through the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations.

(ii) the Office of Planning and Support which is divided into the Planning Division (Mission Planning Service, Civilian Police Unit, Demining Unit, and Training Unit) and the Field Administration and Logistics Division (Finance Management Support Service, Logistics and Communications Service, and Personnel Management and Support Service); and

(iii) the Office of Operations which is divided on a geographical basis (Africa, Asia and Middle East, and Europe and Latin America). (For DPKO's organizational structure, see Annex V);

66. As recommended inter alia by the 1993 JIU report, the former Field Operations Division has been integrated into DPKO and renamed as the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD). The JIU report also recommended that the Situation Centre should evolve into a day-to-day management tool for the Secretary-General and DPKO. The Inspectors note that although this recommendation has not yet been fully implemented, the Centre has improved mechanisms to maintain uninterrupted communications with United Nations operations around the world as well as to collect, screen and disseminate information. Nevertheless the Centre is currently staffed mainly by military officers on loan from Member States at no cost to the United Nations[41] and therefore cannot be considered an assured Secretariat peace-keeping resource.

67. During the interviews for the present report, troop-contributing countries and/or members of the Security Council gave the Inspectors the following assessment of the Department's capacity:

(a) During the past few years, DPKO has made significant progress in developing its capacity to manage peace-keeping operations. However, its structure is not yet fully developed to cope effectively with the complexity of military operations. The integration of the military and civilian sides is not yet fully developed. Unlike, for example, NATO, which is composed of countries with similar levels of development and standards, it is difficult for the United Nations to have the right structure. The DPKO has not solved the perhaps insuperable problem of mounting a peace-keeping effort with troops from countries of dissimilar levels of development and differing standards. It may, be desirable to establish a skeleton of "classical general staff" in DPKO which would manage personnel on loan from troop-contributing countries.

(b) To strengthen DPKO's capacity for strategic and operational activities and procedures it was suggested to tap the experience and knowledge gained by some long-established field operations such as UNTSO (for military observors) and UNFICYD (for peace-keeping troops).

(c) Planning and support functions must be integrated. In this respect, the recent reorganization consolidating the Planning Division and the Field Administration and Logistics Division under one Assistant Secretary-General is welcomed. However, a significant number of troop-contributing countries consider that while FALD is organizationally placed within DPKO, its integration is not complete, and it tends to carry out its functions or parts thereof independent of DPKO or DAM where it was previously placed.

(d) DPKO, which is operating under a tight budget, is not sufficiently staffed to perform tasks assigned to it. As a result, DPKO depends to a significant degree on military personnel on loan from Member States and according to Secretariat officials as of 31 March 1995, 96 military officers were on loan from 29 countries at no cost to the United Nations in order to perform various tasks at Headquarters. Only 23 out of 123 military personnel at Headquarters were on United Nations contract and four were temporarily assigned from field missions. The Inspectors note that one contributing country is not in favour of the staff loan practice. In its opinion this practice is not in conformity with Article 100 of the Charter of the United Nations.

B. The field

68. It is in the field that success or failure of an operation is manifested either on a day-to-day basis or in its final outcome. This is where operational plans and tactical activities are geared to achieve the objectives of a peace-keeping mission. The structures, components and functions of peace-keeping operations in the field may differ from one case to another.

69. A large-scale peace-keeping operation typically consists of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG); the military component headed by a Force Commander; and the civilian component. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General is the head of a mission and has overall responsibility for the operation in the field. The role of the SRSG is particularly important in cases of complex multi-functional missions. The Force Commander is responsible for the organization and smooth functioning of the military component of the mission. The composition of the civilian component, which was fully described in the 1993 JIU report, differs from one peace-keeping mission to another, depending on their mandates. One element which exists in every mission is the support unit/division, headed by a Chief Administrative Officer. The CAO is responsible for the overall management, planning and control of the support for a field operation. In general, support functions consist of procurement, finance, civilian personnel, communications, transport, building management and general services.

70. The task of coordinating activities in the field is entrusted to the SRSG. The head of mission should ensure that national contingent commanders are involved in operational planning and decision-making, especially where their respective contingents are concerned. This can be achieved through adequate consultations among professional leadership within a unified force.[42] Cooperation between the SRSG and the Force Commander of a mission is, however, influenced by the personalities of these two individuals as well as by the different approaches, culture and tasks of the military and the civilian staff. These difficulties can be minimized by a clear translation of the peace-keeping mandate into operational plans and tactical activities and by explicit terms of reference for the SRSG and Force Commander emanating from Headquarters. As an example, and in order to insure good relations among prospective field

leaders a six-day training workshop was held before the United Nations took over the operation in Haiti. The Special Representative, commanders of national contingents from 12 countries and some of the civilian staff attended the workshop.

71. In general horizontal and vertical integration at Headquarters is considered necessary to facilitate greater unity of strategic directives to the field. Corresponding organizational modalities are also required in the field itself in order to implement the directives effectively. As recommended in the JIU 1993 report, the Inspectors believe that more needs to be done at both ends of this relationship.

C. Elements of successful peace-keeping operations

72. Having discussed the structural and functional aspects of peace-keeping at Headquarters and the field, this section will deal with a number of elements of successful peace-keeping operations and the involvement of relevant departments in these issues.

1. Planning

73. Both the Secretariat and Member States recognize the need to strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat for comprehensive planning, including contingency planning, large-scale logistics planning for generic-type missions, and pre-deployment planning for specific missions.

74. The activities required for operational planning for peace-keeping include: translation of policies into operational plans and procedures for implementation; development and updates of basic criteria and parameters for determining and preparing for such requirements as financial, personnel, equipment and services; monitoring developments and trends in order to address potential problems and changing needs; coordination with relevant offices of the Secretariat; examination of implications of changes in the mandates of existing operations; conduct of needs-assessment or fact-finding missions; organization and conduct of training programmes; and identification of strengths and weaknesses of procedures in order to improve future application.[43]

75. The foregoing activities are undertaken by the DPKO Mission Planning Service in cooperation with the DPKO Policy and Analysis Unit and the Logistics and Communications Service in FALD, and when necessary with other departments of the Secretariat, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations. However, DPKO states that at current staffing levels, the Department continues to struggle to cope with day-to-day requirements at the expense of planning.[44]

76. The involvement of other departments or entities in planning for peace-keeping depends on the stage and nature of the peace-keeping operation. Thus, the input of DPA - political research and analysis - is continually required, especially in the early policy formulating stage. Similarly, DHA's input is essential whenever humanitarian aspects feature prominantly in a peace-keeping operation.

77. The Inspectors note that these three departments DPKO, DPA and DHA have been developing, since 1994, the interdepartmental "Framework for Cooperation". The Framework is designed to encourage the development among the staff of the three departments of an attitude of mind of coordination, cooperation and information-sharing, from routine monitoring activities through operations in the field to a final 'Lessons Learned' Seminar by DPKO. The Framework is now being tested. The Inspectors welcome this new development. However, they note that neither DHA nor DPA participate sufficiently in the planning of peace-keeping

operations and believe that this participation should be further institutionalized by the formation of task forces or core groups as was proposed by the JIU report of 1993.

2. Legal arrangements

78. In the course of interviews for the present report, some troop-contributing countries pointed out the need to develop model agreements on a number of issues including: (i) agreements on staff on loan from governments and status of United Nations personnel in the field; (ii) "good neighbour" agreements with countries bordering a mission area, which often play a crucial role in the logistic support of the mission.[45]; (iii) the revision of the 1991 model service agreement (A/46/185), as recommended by the working group of the project on reimbursement to troop-contributing countries[46]; and (iv) the elaboration of a code of conduct for United Nations peace-keeping personnel, consistent with applicable international humanitarian law.[47]

79. The Office of the Legal Counsel and the General Legal Division in the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) are responsible for assisting in the formulation of legal agreements such as those mentioned above as well as for legal backstopping of peace-keeping operations. About 40 per cent of the General Legal Division's budget and some extrabudgetary resources are spent on work related to peace-keeping. The budget of OLA, however, has not been increased to keep up with the growing volume of work.

80. Not all legal agreements are submitted to OLA for review despite Administrative Instruction ST/AI/52 (25 June 1948), which stipulates that OLA should clear all legal agreements. It may, therefore, be necessary to revise the Administrative Instruction to make it more relevant to the current situation. Certain legal agreements in the peace-keeping area are relatively inconsequential and do not really require a formal clearance. The Inspectors believe that an updated Administrative Instruction should be issued giving the OLA the option to determine which legal agreement requires a formal legal review and clearance and which does not.

3. Training

81. The training of personnel for peace-keeping operations is essentially the responsibility of Member States. The role of the United Nations is to establish basic guidelines and performance standards and provide advisory services. Peace-keeping training based on common standards and a common curriculum is useful to minimize the difficulties that result from units and individuals from various countries operating jointly. In order to promote a common approach, a Training Unit was established in DPKO in 1992.

82. In 1995, the activities of the DPKO Training Unit included: (1) preparation of six United Nations teams to assist in the development of specialized training programmes of Member States; (2) provision of technical support and advice to 45 national or regional peace-keeping training institutions; (3) convening three regional workshops with the leaders of existing peace-keeping training centres in order to share methods and coordinate a common United Nations peace-keeping doctrine; and (4) provision of technical assistance and advice to well over 70 troop-contributing countries.

83. In the course of interviews for the present report, the Inspectors were apprised of a number of ideas from troop-contributing countries for peace-keeping training. Although basic military training should be undertaken at the national level, special training for peace-keeping should be carried out by the United Nations or by Member States with the assistance of the United Nations. Such special training would include particular circumstances of special

missions; peace-keeping techniques - such as persuasion and mediation - and sensitivity and respect for local customs and cultures. Training courses for future/potential force commanders and high-level officials were also recommended.

84. One important issue concerning the use of United Nations forces in support of humanitarian operations is the need for the military to understand and respect the impartial and neutral nature of humanitarian activities and organizations. Training for peace-keepers should therefore include instruction and orientation on the nature of humanitarian organizations. The Military and Civil Defense Assets (MCDA) Project, which was initiated by DHA in 1992, is developing a training programme that includes relevant instructions and the preparation of guidelines and manuals.[48]

4. Information

85. The Secretary-General concludes in his "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" that peace-keeping operations need an effective information capacity. This is particularly necessary for those missions operating in difficult circumstances so as to explain their mandate to the population and, by providing a credible and impartial source of information, to counter misinformation disseminated about them.[49]

86. The influence of the media on the success or failure of peace-keeping is significant. Reports by former United Nations Force Commanders indicate that international media reporting is sometimes aligned to propaganda of one party or distorts the situation. At times emotions can become involved in reporting on a peace-keeping situation; as can reporting from an idealistic perspective that does not take into account the realities on the ground or the practical consequences of such reporting for the peace-keeping operation. These factors can seriously affect a peace-keeping operation unless offset by an independent information management effort by the United Nations.

87. Thus, the United Nations needs to develop a coherent and coordinated approach to information activities on peace-keeping. Such an approach must avoid the danger - endemic in large-scale operations in which many agencies are involved - of many uncoordinated spokesmen. Accordingly the Secretary-General has instructed that the possible need for an information capacity should be examined at an early stage in the planning of future operations.[50] The Security Council supports the Secretary-General's intention.[51] Presumably this requirement will be assisted by the planned establishment in 1996 of a Mission Information Unit in DPI in cooperation with DPKO.[52]

5. Logistic support services

88. Representatives of several troop-contributing countries informed the Inspectors that United Nations administrative and logistics support for peace-keeping operations was slow. DPKO attributed these deficiencies to the fact that the present administrative and financial rules and regulations of the United Nations were not geared to field operations. Although some attempts had been made in 1994 to delegate certain areas of authority to DPKO, they were not enough. A comprehensive review and revision of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations assisted by Member States is scheduled for completion by July 1996.[53]

89. During the course of interviews for the present report some troop-contributing countries stated that they were dissatisfied with the procurement and logistics support services of the Secretariat, in particular those of FALD; and that their dissatisfaction had resulted in their proposing, at the General Assembly, a review of Secretariat services in these areas. As a consequence, by resolution 49/233 of the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General

to entrust the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to undertake "An inspection of the units within the Secretariat responsible for logistical, operational and administrative arrangements in peace-keeping and other field operations, with a view to identifying problems and recommending measures to enhance the efficient utilizations of resources".

D. Recommendations

RECOMMENDATION 8. That the Secretary-General continue his efforts to assure that DPKO, as the lead peace-keeping department, seek, receive, and benefit from the contribution of other United Nations Departments in the planning and management of peace-keeping operations.

RECOMMENDATION 9. That the Secretary-General:

(a) enhance the planning and operational capacity of DPKO, including the translation of the peace-keeping mandate into a detailed and specific operational plan comprehensible to all, especially at Headquarters and in the field, by establishing within the Department "classical general staff" with the possibility of having personnel on loan from different Member States;

(b) ensure that DPKO build up its capacity to gather and analyse more information about areas of peace-keeping, inter alia with the possible assistance of Member States;

(c) also ensure that the DPKO build up skilled personnel, both military and civilian, amongst whom a rapidly deployable temporary Headquarters team can be despatched to the field at a short notice;

(d) carry out the full integration of the Field Administration and Logistics Division within the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

RECOMMENDATION 10. That the Secretary-General, acting through his field representatives, maximize synergy among military contingents and between military and civilian components, with particular emphasis on the maintenance of strict and reciprocal channels of communication within the field and between Headquarters and the field.

Notes

1. "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations" (A/50/60-S/1995/1).

2. Staffing of the United Nations peace-keeping and related missions (civilian component) (JIU/REP/93/6).

3. Papers of the Working Group on Political Direction and Support, (established at the Brainstorming Session on Peace-keeping, sponsored by the Canadian Government, Ottawa, 29 April-1 May 1994), "Working paper", p.12.

4. "Command and control of United Nations peace-keeping operations" (A/49/681), para. 17.

5. "Statement by the President of the Security Council" (S/PRST/1995/9), P.2.

6. Sanderson, J.M.; "Consensus without objectivity: Problems of command and control for United Nations peace-keeping", paper presented at the 25th Vienna Seminar, 2-4 March 1995, p.12.

7. Papers of the Working Group on Political Direction and Support, op. cit., para. 22.

8. "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace", op. cit., para. 45.

9. "An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping" (A/47/277-S/24111), para. 51.

10. DPKO, "United Nations Standby Arrangements System Description", pp. 1-2.

11. S/PRST/1995/9, op. cit. page 2.

12. "Report of the Special committee on peace-keeping operations" (A/50/230), paras. 78-80.

13. A/50/60-S/1995/1, op. cit., paras. 43-44.

14. Urquhart, Brian; "UN Force: Prospects for a UN rapid response capability" paper submitted 25th Vienna Seminar, 2-4 March 1995, p. 3.

15. The Netherlands, "A United Nations rapid deployment brigade - a preliminary study", (The Netherland's non-paper), revised version, April 1995.

16. Denmark, "United Nations Stand-by Arrangements for Peace-keeping: A multinational United Nations Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade", 8 March 1995, p. 2.

17. S/RES/998 (1995), paras. 9 and 10.

18. Letter dated 9 June 1995 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/470), p. 2.

19. S/PRST/1995/9, page 4.

20. A/50/60-A/1995/1, op. cit., para. 88.

21. "Effective planning, budgeting and administration of peace-keeping operations" (A/48/945), para. 62.

22. "Report of the Special committee on peace-keeping operations", op.cit., para. 56.

23. See also "Investigation of the relationship between humanitarian assistance and peace-keeping operations", JIU/REP/95/6, Recommendation 10, p. ix and para. 116, p. 29.

24. "Death and disability benefits" (A/49/906), paras. 4-6.

25. "Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peace-keeping operations - Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions" (A/49/664), para. 87.

26. A/49/906, paras. 25-26.

27. Ibid., paras. 19 and 20.

28. "Report of the Phase II Working Group on Reimbursement of Contingent-Owned Equipment" (A/C.5/49/66), annex II, para. 3.

29. Ibid., paras. 7 and 8.

30. A/49/664, paras. 104-106.

31. A/C.5/49/66, chapter IV.

32. Ibid., annex II, paras. 4 and 16.

33. A/50/60-S/1995/1, op. cit., para. 45.

34. "Establishment of a transparent and effective system of accountability and responsibility" (A/C.5/49/1), para. 25.

35. High-level Expert Procurement Group, "Procurement Study" (December 1994), para. 2.

36. "Progress in the implementation of procurement reform in the United Nations Secretariat" (A/C.5/49/67).

37. Ibid., para. 7.

38. S/49/681, para. 11.

39. A/49/336, paras. 11 (a) and 12.

40. ST/SGB/Organization, Section:DPKO, (22 March 1995), p.1.

41. As of April 1995, the staff of the Situation Centre comprised five civilians and 21 military officers. All of the military, except five, were provided by Member States at no cost to the United Nations.

42. A/49/681, op. cit., para. 19.

43. A/49/717, para. 14 (e).

44. A/49/681, op. cit., para. 16.

45. This was proposed by the Secretary-General: A/49/945, para. 106.

46. WG/COE/Phase II/WP3, para. 42.

47. Report of the Special committee on peace-keeping operations, op.cit. paras. 68-72.

48. Akashi, Yasushi; "Lessons from Cambodia", p. 9.

49. A/50/60-S/1995/1, op. cit., para. 46.

50. Ibid.

51. S/PRST/1995/9, op. cit., p. 2.

52. Cf. "Communication for development programmes in the United Nations system", JIU/REP/94/4, Recommendation 10, p. ix.

53. A/C.5/49/67, para. 19.

Annex I

UNITED NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/PRST/1994/62
4 November 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the 3448th meeting of the Security Council, held on 4 November 1994, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "An agenda for peace: peace-keeping", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council has given further consideration to the question of communication between members and non-members of the Council, in particular troop contributing-countries, which was addressed in the statement of the President of the Council of 3 May 1994 (S/PRST/1994/22). The Council remains conscious of the implications that its decisions on peace-keeping operations have for troop-contributing countries. Having regard to the increase in the number and complexity of such operations, it believes that there is a need for further enhancement, in a pragmatic and flexible manner, of the arrangements for consultation and exchange of information with troop-contributing countries.

"To this end, the Security Council has decided in future to follow the procedures set out in this statement:

"(a) Meetings should be held as a matter of course between members of the Council, troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat to facilitate the exchange of information and views in good time before the Council takes decisions on the extension or termination of, or significant changes in, the mandate of a particular peace-keeping operation;

"(b) Such meetings would be chaired jointly by the Presidency of the Council and a representative of the Secretariat nominated by the Secretary-General;

"(c) The monthly tentative forecast of work of the Council made available to Member States will in future include an indication of the expected schedule of such meetings for the month;

"(d) In the context of their review of the tentative forecast, the members of the Council will examine this schedule and communicate any suggested changes or proposals as to the timing of meetings to the Secretariat;

/...

"(e) Ad hoc meetings chaired jointly by the Presidency of the Security Council and a representative of the Secretariat nominated by the Secretary-General may be convened in the event of unforeseen developments in a particular peace-keeping operation which could require action by the Council;

"(f) Such meetings will be in addition to those convened and chaired solely by the Secretariat for troop contributors to meet with special representatives of the Secretary-General or force commanders or to discuss operational matters concerning particular peace-keeping operations, to which members of the Security Council will also be invited;

"(g) An informal paper, including topics to be covered and drawing attention to relevant background documentation, will be circulated by the Secretariat to the participants well in advance of each of the various meetings referred to above;

"(h) The time and venue of each meeting with members of the Council and troop contributors to a peace-keeping operation should, where possible, appear in advance in the Journal of the United Nations;

"(i) The President of the Council will, in the course of informal consultations of members of the Council, summarize the views expressed by participants at each meeting with troop contributors.

"The Security Council recalls that the arrangements described herein are not exhaustive. Consultations may take a variety of forms, including informal communication between the Council President or its members and troop-contributing countries and, as appropriate, with other countries especially affected, for example countries from the region concerned.

"The Security Council will keep arrangements for the exchange of information and views with troop contributors under review and stands ready to consider further measures to enhance arrangements in the light of experience.

"The Security Council will also keep under review arrangements to improve the quality and speed of the flow of information available to support Council decision-making, bearing in mind the conclusions contained in its statement of 3 May 1994 (S/PRST/1994/22)."

Annex II

UNITED NATIONS STAND-BY ARRANGEMENTS: STATUS REPORT AS OF 9 MAY 1995

1. To date 55 countries have been visited and negotiations/discussions are ongoing with 80 Member States.

2. Thus far 41 countries have officially expressed their willingness to participate in Standby Arrangements. The latest being addition being **Australia** and the latest correction being the removal of Zambia:

a. 31 have confirmed their participation and are in the process of staffing full details of their contributions, namely:

Argentina	**Belgium**	**Belarus**	**Bulgaria**
Canada	**Chad**	**Czech Rep**	**Denmark**
Finland	**France**	**Guatemala**	**Hungary**
India	**Jordan**	**Malaysia**	**Myanmar**
Portugal	**Netherlands**	**New Zealand**	**Norway**
Pakistan	**Poland**	**Rep. Korea**	**Senegal**
Spain	**Sri Lanka**	**Syria**	**Ukraine**
U.K.	**U.S.A**	**Uruguay**	

b. 10 have agreed in principle and are currently finalizing their eventual contributions, namely:

Australia	**Egypt**	**Germany**	**Ghana**
Indonesia	**Italy**	**Rumania**	**Slovenia**
Sudan	**Turkey**		

c. Of the above 41 countries, ten have submitted volumetrics, namely: **France, Syria, Belgium, U.K., Denmark, Czech. Rep, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Pakistan and Jordan**; and

d. Of the above 41 countries, two has signed MOUs with the UN, namely: **Jordan** and **Denmark.**

3. The breakdown of resources that could be made available to the UN (approximately 72000 based on UN Tables of Organizations and Equipment -- currently under review) by organizational structures is as follows:

a. Units (battalion size):

Confirmed:	82 (See note 1)
Promised:	94 (See note 2)
Considered:	125 (See note 3)

/...

b. Sub-Units (Company size):

Confirmed:	45
Promised:	44
Considered:	49

c. Elements (Platoon and Team size):

Confirmed:	28
Promised:	30
Considered:	51

d. Specialists and Services. Due to diverse types of contributions, this listing is made available on as required basis.

5. Notwithstanding the above resources, the following capabilities are either non-existent or not in sufficient number to allow for appropriate mission support:

Communications
Transport
Regional clinics
Inventory control elements
PX elements
Tactical Transport Utility Aircraft
Multi-role logistics
Multi-role health services
Engineer sub-units
Procurement elements
Ordnance Disposal elements

Notes:

(1) Confirmed: means that a Member State has confirmed its commitments and has sent/is about to submit a detailed description of its contributions.

(2) Promised: means that a Member State has promised (during exploratory discussions) to confirm the provision of specific numbers and types of resources. This is to be interpreted as an unofficial commitment awaiting formal written commitment.

(3) Considered: means that a Member State has only agreed to consider a list of possible contributions developed by the Standby Arrangements Management Team.

/...

_____ Country Name

SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS

CONTRIBUTIONS						
Nat'l No.	Description of	Category of	Source of	Availability	Response Time	Remarks
1	Planning Experts	Personnel	Civilian	Deployed	10 days	
2	Election Monitors	Personnel	Civilian	Deployed	10 days	
3	Human Rights Experts	Personnel	Civilian	Deployed	10 days	
4	Doctors	Personnel	Civilian	Deployed	10 days	
5	Pharmacist	Personnel	Civilian	Deployed	10 days	
6	Nurse	Personnel	Civilian	Deployed	10 days	
7	Medical Profession Technicians	Personnel	Civilian	Deployed	10 days	
8	Medical Supplies	Personnel	Civilian	Deployed	10 days	
9	Engineers and Technicians for Aircraft	Personnel	Civilian	Deployed	10 days	
10	Air Transportation	Services	Commercial	Deployed	3 days	Tristan L1011 246 seats Airbus A310 185 seats Airbus A320 144 seats JYAFH Aircraft 8 passengers JYAPP Aircraft 7 passengers Boeing B727 143 seats Boeing B707 40 tong (freight)

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_____ Country Name

SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS

CONTRIBUTIONS						
Nat'l No.	Description of	Category of	Source of	Availability	Response Time	Remarks
11	Engineers and Technicians for Communications	Personnel	Civilian	Deployed	10 days	
12	Jordanian Airport Services	Land	Government	Not Deployed	10 days	
13	Train Human Elements to Specialize in the Field of Aviation	Services	Government	Not Deployed	10 days	
14	Lorries (as required)	Services	Government	Not Deployed	3 days	
15	1500 Meals (daily)	Services	Civilian	Deployed	3 days	
16	UNMO's	Personnel	Military	Deployed	10 days	
17	Special Force Platoon	Personnel	Military	Deployed	10 days	
18	Weapons	Weaponry	Military	Deployed	10 days	
19	Vehicles	Equipment	Military	Deployed	10 days	
20	Police Specialists	Personnel	Civ/Pol	Deployed	10 days	
21	Police Batches	Personnel	Civ/Pol	Deployed	10 days for first batch	First batch will be deployed within a response time of 10 days - after which deployments of batches will be done every 30 days.
22	30 Beds in Private Hospitals	Services	Civilian	Not Deployed	As requested (within 48 hours)	
23	Aircraft Maintenance in Jordanian Airports	Services	Civilian	Not Deployed	As requested	
24	Mobile Hospitals with 30 Beds	Services		Not Deployed	3 days	

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Annex IV

Principles guiding relationships between the United Nations and regional organizations and arrangements

SUPPLEMENT TO AN AGENDA FOR PEACE: POSITION PAPER OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE OCCASION OF THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

88. Such principles include:

(a) Agreed mechanisms for consultation should be established, but need not be formal;

(b) The primacy of the United Nations, as set out in the Charter, must be respected. In particular, regional organizations should not enter into arrangements that assume a level of United Nations support not yet submitted to or approved by its Member States. This is an area where close and early consultation is of great importance;

(c) The division of labour must be clearly defined and agreed in order to avoid overlap and institutional rivalry where the United Nations and a regional organization are both working on the same conflict. In such cases it is also particularly important to avoid a multiplicity of mediators;

(d) Consistency by members of regional organizations who are also Member States of the United Nations is needed in dealing with a common problem of interest to both organizations, for example, standards for peace-keeping operations.

Organisational structure of United Nations entities concerned with peace-keeping operations

Annex V

1 July 1995



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Organisational structure of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations

Annex VI

1 July 1995